Wyatt highlights the history of the profession in the United States from the 1940s to the present. In the 1940s the largest accounting firms were relatively small as compared to today's behemoths. Small- to medium-sized firms have a professional advantage because each employee receives checks and balances from the scrutiny of other partners. Very large firms lose some of these safeguards because of dispersed locations, differentiated talents, and a focus on revenue growth. Wyatt muses, "whether a split-up of a big firm would enhance the firm's quality control and permit more effective delivery of quality service."

Wyatt discusses the impact of the computer upon the accounting profession and the genesis of "consulting services." With lofty revenues that consulting services brought in, accounting firms gradually shifted their emphasis from quality audits to an accent on "expansion in the range of services offered." Abraham Briloff and Eli Mason became early critics of this transformation, but the profession ignored their apprehensions.

By the 1990s the SEC also voiced concerns about the possible erosion of professionalism, "but the Commission was not able to demonstrate any direct tie-in between consulting arrangement fees and the granting of an inappropriate opinion on financial statements by the auditors." While I agree with this analysis by Wyatt, at this point I wish he would have added that the SEC could not establish this case because no such quid pro quos exist. Critics such as Briloff, Mason, and I have not argued that any such direct connections occur; among other things, we think virtually everybody would recognize such unethical lapses. My arguments have focused on what the change in focus has produced in terms of a new mindset and a new culture, and I have attempted to raise these unconscious thoughts, feelings, and decisions to the level where they would become decipherable.

Over this period the large accounting firms started hiring a massive number of non-accountants. In the 1960s these firms compelled non-accountants to learn some accounting, but gradually over time they dropped this requirement. Unfortunately, that decision created a large class of individuals who worked for the accounting profession with no vested interest in the profession. With no commitment to the profession, and with the generation of large consulting fees and a growing rancor about how the firm should divide the profits among audit partners and consulting principals, the large accounting firms eventually mutated into organizations with much less concern about professionalism.

A barometer of this transformation process can be seen in the leaders of the profession. Decades ago "the large firms were headed by a leading accounting profession" who "spoke forcefully on the issues of the day." For examples, Wyatt mentions Spacek, Defliese, Bevis, Palmer, and Queenan. Today's leaders have marketing and sales expertise but possess relatively little accounting prowess.

To reverse course and save the profession, Wyatt suggests that firms begin by acknowledging what has transpired and create mechanisms to "restore a proper, and expected, degree of professionalism." He suggests several steps for auditing firms to take:

These are great ideas, and I hope present leaders actually deliberate over them.

I also found interesting Wyatt's comments about university education. Decades ago accounting education emphasized auditing and "professionalism and the accounting code of ethics" to a greater extent than today. In addition to his tremendous service at Arthur Andersen and the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Art Wyatt had an illustrious career at the University of Illinois. Because of his insights, I wish he had pursed this aspect to a greater extent and offered academia some steps that it should take. Let's hope he writes a future essay on the topic.